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Abstract: Transparency is most often defi ned as the absence of asymmetrical information between 
fi nancial markets and monetary policy makers. There are different views on the central 
bank transparency (Assuring, Exacting, Irrelevance, Conditional, Disturbing and Diverting 
view). The examination of the central bank transparency is actually the examination of the 
effects of infl ation targeting.
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Introduction
Central banking system has undergone signifi cant changes during the last ten years. 
There are three characteristics of modern central bank system: independence, ac-
countability and transparency. Although the importance of central bank independ-
ence and accountability was already discussed in academic literature, the research on 
monetary policy transparency are relatively new and to a great extent are responsible 
for the best practice of central banking system. Central bank transparency has be-
come one of the key characteristics of monetary policy. 
First, we will discuss the concept of transparency that is not easy to defi ne. How-
ever, it is commonly defi ned as the absence of asymmetrical information between 
fi nancial markets and monetary policy makers. Then some practical views on central 
bank transparency will be presented (Assuring, Exacting, Irrelevance, Conditional, 
Disturbing and Diverting view).
Chapter 1. Concept of central bank transparency 
Defi nition of central bank transparency 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s there has been an interest in academic litera-
ture on the role of transparency in monetary policy-making, which partly refl ects the 
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increased attention that central bank devotes to communication issues in monetary 
policy practice. A trend towards greater transparency can be related to increasing in-
dependence and accountability of central bank in a large number of countries. Then, 
it can be associated with the importance of recognizing fi nancial markets and private 
agents’ expectations for the outcome of monetary policy conduct. Greater transpar-
ency makes monetary policy more predictable as well as more effective and credible. 
The concept of transparency cannot be easily defi ned. In the standard models used in 
literature transparency is defi ned as the amount and precision of information that the 
central bank releases to the public.1
Most commonly, transparency implies the absence of asymmetrical information 
between fi nancial markets and monetary policy makers. Release of precise, com-
prehensive information at regular intervals (in time) is useful since it reduces the 
information asymmetry and uncertainty in fi nancial markets.
The increasing trend of central bank transparency has been fi rst observed in the 
central banks of New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain and Sweden. They adopted 
“infl ation targeting” as a frame of monetary policy during the early 1990s. This mon-
etary strategy is characterized by explicit targeting/aiming of low and stable infl ation 
rates, announcing infl ation forecasts and monetary policy changes (interest rates) 
depending on whether the predicted infl ation rate is above or below targeted rate. 
The examining of central bank transparency mainly consists of the examining of 
infl ation targeting effects. 
The increase of transparency has greatly been infl uenced by the practice of pub-
lishing the Infl ation Report, which is especially common for countries that accepted 
infl ation targeting as monetary strategy. The Infl ation Report includes the follow-
ing:
1. Basic infl ation determinants;
2. Infl ation forecast and its assumptions;              
3. Explanation why changes in monetary policy were (or were not) necessary and
4. Explanation of expected effects of changes in monetary policy 
A lack of transparency could be said to arise when the central bank has private 
information about the nature of shocks and the way in which monetary policy affects 
economy (Cukierman, 1992, 2000); or when the central bank has not stated its objec-
tives clearly (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986); or when the public is uncertain about 
the preferences of the central bank (Nolan and Schaling, 1998).2
Limits to transparency
In the academic literature “perfect transparency” is regarded as being achieved when 
the public is given all the information it needs to be able to infer the central bank’s 
intentions from its monetary policy measures.3
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However, in the real world this problem is much more complex. “Perfect trans-
parency” might imply that the central bank must make available all the information 
that contributed no matter to which extent, to its decisions. But on purely practical 
grounds it cannot publish everything, such as the minutes of all the meetings, every 
discussion about conceptual or statistical defi nitions, all information at its disposal 
etc. Therefore, in practice transparency can never be complete and perfect as in theo-
retical models. Finally, it can be argued whether maximum information really leads 
to maximum transparency. Even if infl ation forecasts were to be announced, the 
public would wonder whether this was really the only infl ation forecast made by the 
central bank. Similarly, if minutes of meetings were published, some people would 
ask whether they really contain everything that was discussed when decisions on 
a particular monetary policy measure were made. In the real world there are also 
technical limits to processing information, so the relevant core has to be selected and 
interpreted from the mass of data available.
Most economists consider greater transparency in monetary policy desirable since 
it enables the private sector to be more effective in decision-making (i.e. to improve 
welfare) and to make decisions based on more information available. But, some does 
not agree with this statement. Some argue incomplete transparency to be optimal, 
since the effect on the central bank credibility and its ability to control infl ation must 
be balanced with regard to the orientation of the private sector to accomplish other 
goals, such as output, employment, prices etc. Others claim that certain restrictions 
to transparency are signifi cant for operational reasons. 
The purpose of transparency
Since most economic decisions are made under uncertain conditions, assessments 
of current and future trends play a key role in economic decision-making.4 If these 
assessments are wrong, the decisions based on them are likely to be wrong as well. 
Therefore, institutions operating at the macroeconomic level should keep the uncer-
tainty regarding their policy as small as possible. At least, they should make sure 
they do not increase existing uncertainty.
With respect to the central bank, transparency requirement applies in the fi rst 
instance to minimizing uncertainty associated with its monetary policy. Advocates 
of ultra-transparency demand that the central bank reveal each and every detail and 
piece of evidence on which its decisions are based. They are of the opinion that this 
would make the central bank more predictable. The advocates and potential benefi -
ciaries of this extreme defi nition of transparency are above all the fi nancial markets. 
They can profi tably convert the information into transactions. The request for greater 
predictability of the central bank is also prompted by the need to avoid market over-
reaction and the associated excessive volatility.  
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However, predictability also has its disadvantages. It can make the central bank a 
hostage to the market. The central bank would then be forced to act, or rather react, 
solely in order to meet the short-term expectations of interest parties. Therefore, the 
limits for central bank predictability have to be defi ned. To ensure that the central 
bank can counteract undesirable developments, its activity must not be completely 
predictable all the time. The short-term horizon is being discussed here, of course.
Instrument and target transparency
In general, central banks use instruments to infl uence their operational goal in order 
to infl uence the ultimate goal of monetary policy.  For example, the Federal Reserve 
targeted the excessive liquidity (operational goal) from 1979 to 1982, and then they 
started to target monetary aggregates as operational goal. By the late 1980s, the Fed-
eral Reserve abandoned the targeting of monetary aggregates and took up explicit 
targeting of interest rates in money market. Not until 1994 did the Federal Reserve 
announce that the interest rate is operational goal. The instrument transparency ex-
ists when the public is familiar with the goal of the central bank and instruments that 
the central bank uses to pursue that goal.
The most common goals of central bank are price stability alone, or, rarely, both 
price stability and output increase. Target transparency exists when the public is fa-
miliar with the goals of the central bank including the relative signifi cance of every 
goal, if they were numerous. 
A great number of central banks have adopted “infl ation targeting” (e.g. New 
Zealand, Canada, Great Britain, Switzerland) with specifi c numerical interval for 
target infl ation rate.  
Central bank uses certain policy instruments in order to achieve its goals in de-
fi ned time frame. Adjustments of policy instruments depend on the estimation of 
macroeconomic developments by the central bank, since the expected infl uence of 
the policy on the economy is based on the way in which the makers of that policy 
understand the functioning of the economy. The interpretation of macroeconomic 
developments creates a link between policy goals and instrument changes. Trans-
parency in policy exists when the public is familiar with the way in which the in-
formation on economy status is transformed into actions. That connection includes 
relevant information that the central bank may have, economic models (if any) that 
monetary policy makers use to explain economy functioning and the way in which 
decisions are made. 
For each type of transparency, there is also the possibility of different degrees of 
transparency.5 For example, the central bank may announce that it targets interest 
rates, but not state what the current level is. The central bank may announce that it 
is concerned with both infl ation and output, but not what it considers to be their op-
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timal relation. In some cases, it may not be possible for a central bank to be precise; 
the models it uses do not have adequate performances. Alternatively, the central 
bank may not believe in any economic model, thus not explaining the functioning of 
economy. Most central banks currently use a short-term interest rate as their policy 
instrument and precisely quantify their goals (operational and ultimate).
Chapter 2. Different views of central bank transparency
Introductory notes
Like many other broad concepts in economic policy, such as “fi scal discipline” or 
“price stability”, central bank transparency remains a matter open to debate. Widely 
used term “infl ation targeting” is usually considered the expression of increased cen-
tral bank transparency.6 
In practice, central bank transparency has implications for a certain number of 
relevant day-to-day issues that include: the persistence of infl ation, the response of 
fi nancial markets to central bank announcements, the role of short term targets, that 
is, the central bank transparency infl uence on short-term and medium-term expecta-
tions of the private sector etc. The effect of greater transparency on these dynamics 
is considered to be benefi cial. Although there are some other interpretations accord-
ing to which excessive transparency is unduly constraining, leading to sub-optimal 
results, they are without empirical foundation. 
Recent developments in Japan and, to a lesser degree, in the United States and 
the Eurozone, have demonstrated that central bank independence can be at risk when 
transparency increases by adopting infl ation targeting as a monetary strategy. 
Two common misleading claims about transparency relate to the misconception 
that increased transparency inhibits central bank independence and that the high lev-
el of transparency automatically means central bank accountability.
 More explicitly, there are six views of enhanced transparency impact on the reac-
tion of the public and markets in relation to the monetary policy.7
1. The public could be assured via information such as monetary policy objectives 
and their fulfi llment, description of monetary policy regime, current measures, as 
well as their expected effects; 
2. The public and particularly markets could fi nd it easier to plan their activities if 
central bank prognosis and respective explanations are available;
3. The public can fi nd all announcements of the central bank irrelevant as long as 
central banks start to respond to shocks more strictly;
4. The public, and especially markets, can become greatly aware of central bank 
activities and demand information about central bank mandate and voting of par-
ticular members of monetary board; 
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5. The public, and particularly markets, can become disturbed if central bank fails 
to fulfi ll its objectives or forecasts. Also, too much information can pose a threat 
since this can  make public confused;
6. The public can make pressure on the fulfi llment of announced objective thus 
diverting central bank from optimal response to shocks. If politicians become 
involved in such situation, the result shall be higher level of intervention than it 
is desirable. 
As it can be seen in Table 1 each of these six practical views of central bank trans-
parency focuses on a specifi c set of information releases, with a specifi c hypothesis 
for the impact of those releases upon expectations and central bank behavior, and 
for the mechanism by which this impact is transmitted. Examination of central bank 
transparency is largely a matter of examining the effects of infl ation targeting.







































































Source: Adam S. Posen, Senior Fellow (2002), “Six Practical Views of Central Bank Transparency”
The Assuring View of Central Bank Transparency
The “assuring view” is the view in which the central bank communicates its gen-
eral intentions to the public and the markets. The key information released by the 
central bank, in operational terms, is statements about the monetary regime, about 
the goals of that regime and factors which made bank fail to fulfi ll that goal, that is, 
to reduce or increase infl ation in relation to the targeted one. These are conveyed in 
the speeches of monetary policy makers (usually voting board members) about the 
intentions of the central bank. 
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The theoretical framework or underlying model for such a view of central bank 
transparency is the “optimal state contingent rule”.8 In this framework, communica-
tion by the central bank about its long-term infl ation goal allows the bank to be more 
fl exible in response to (supply) shocks. Greater fl exibility is the result of greater trust 
in the central bank that its deviations from the target do not indicate a lack of com-
mitment to the long-term target. The hypothesis of the optimal state contingent rule 
is testable.  
“Assuring” view of central bank transparency is that infl ation will decrease as the 
central bank approaches the “optimal contingent state” (which implies greater trust). 
In this situation, one-time shocks will not have effects on infl ation expectations since 
it is expected that long-term infl ation will return to target level.
Empirical evidence is quite strong in support of this view. Kuttner and Posen 
(1999) observed the shift in bond market responses (representing infl ation expecta-
tions) in Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom before and after adopt-
ing infl ation targeting as monetary strategy9. They examined: (1) whether there is a 
change in infl ation dynamics; (2) whether there is a tendency towards an increase in 
infl ation rates following shocks; (3) whether there is a tendency towards a decrease 
in interest rates. There is strong evidence of decreases in interest rates, consistent 
with the interpretation that adoption of infl ation targeting increases central bank fl ex-
ibility.
If transparency in the form of infl ation targeting does reduce infl ation persist-
ence, it has a major impact on welfare. Therefore one policy implication of this view 
is that explicit statements of long-term goals in a world of shocks provide benefi ts 
and that implicit infl ation targeting, characteristic of the Federal Reserve, does not. 
When shocks arise, market expectations will bring back infl ation rate to expected 
long-term pathway.
The Exacting View of Central Bank Transparency 
The exacting view of central bank transparency is much narrower than that of the as-
suring view, and much more focused on the response of fi nancial markets to central 
bank behavior. The information released by central banks important to this view is 
that of forecasts, economic models, and the accompanying explanations of specifi c 
central bank decisions (e.g., interest rate movements). For instance, the Federal Re-
serve has taken steps in this direction, for example, by eliminating directives sug-
gesting changes between meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
and announcing the monetary aggregates rate target, along with the rationale for the 
decision. This view suggests that detailed information will allow the (bond) markets 
to see greater predictability in central bank actions. Some European central banks in 
the 1970s and 1980s tended to surprise markets with their exchange rate and other 
interventions so as to intentionally cause greater uncertainty in markets. 
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The testable hypothesis of this view is whether shifts in disclosure policy about 
central bank decisions affect the market response. The evidence is clear in the US 
Treasury Securities market where the changes in disclosure policies of the Federal 
Reserve in the last 15 years (particularly since 1994) have reduced market volatility 
and increased monetary policy predictability. There is less clear evidence regarding 
foreign exchange markets and very short-term movements in fi nancial markets (in-
cluding bond markets). 
This effect is independent and acts through different channels (and over a short 
time frame) than the effect examined under the assurance view: the independent 
variable is interest rate in the exacting view, but explanation of long-term targets in 
the assuring view; the dependent variable is market volatility in the exacting view 
and infl ation persistence in the assuring view. This has the implication on monetary 
policy, that is, the policy of exacting view of transparency can have its effects with-
out any change in fundamental regime of infl ation targeting.10
The Irrelevance View of Central Bank Transparency 
This list of practical views of central bank transparency must include the commonly 
expressed view of some central bankers (particularly in the USA) that central bank 
transparency is irrelevant for central bank effi cacy. This “irrelevance view” asserts that 
this is a very cheap trick, and that central bank credibility is built up only through its 
actions. The only private information the central bank has is about its own preferences 
(goals) while the focus of markets and the public is on infl ation and output outcomes.
The empirical implication of this irrelevance view is that changes in policy an-
nouncements should be ineffective in changing infl ation expectations. Explicit infl a-
tion targeting should be indistinguishable from implicit infl ation targeting in its effects, 
so long as both have the same goal for infl ation, presuming the same real variables. 
However, this view is rejected by the empirical data. The classifi cation of monetary 
regimes directly separates those central banks that explicitly target infl ation from the 
central banks without announced targets, and establishes that those that explicitly target 
infl ation have lower infl ation (and lower infl ation persistence) than those with implicit 
infl ation targeting (such as the Federal Reserve). In short, explicit infl ation targeting 
seems to matter, whereas the irrelevance view of transparency suggests that infl ation 
targeting does not. This has a signifi cant implication for some central banks that claim 
that there is no need for the public announcement of infl ation target.11
The Conditional View of Central Bank Transparency 
The view of central bank transparency based on the most sophisticated theoretical 
framework and attracting the most research attention is the conditional view. This 
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group of models (Cukierman, 2001; Faust and Svensson, 2001a, 2001b) is based 
directly on the work about the optimal level of transparency. It is presumed that 
credible central banks should induce more fl exibility in price and wage setting (and 
a more vertical short-run Phillips curve). Consequently, monetary policy instruments 
are thought to have less effect on the real economy. Accordingly, there is an inverted 
U-shaped curve that represents the desirable level of transparency and shows that 
the central banks with extremely high or extremely low credibility level should have 
the highest level of transparency. The key information, in this view, is about central 
banks’ mandates and the votes of monetary policy board members. In this frame-
work it is possible to test whether there is a connection between infl ation volatility 
and output volatility. This is because in the model of the more credible central bank 
there is a stabilization of infl ation, at the expense of the stabilization of output, while 
the role of the central bank in the output stabilization is minimal.
The practical dangers that arise from premature acceptance of this conditional 
view without adequate empirical support is threefold: fi rst, it may encourage some 
“fi ne regulating” of transparency for the supposed optimal level of information dis-
closure and thus take some of the benefi ts seen in the assuring and exacting views; 
second, and related, it may put an undue emphasis on the release of mandates and 
votes to the detriment of other important information disclosures available to cen-
tral banks; and third, it may contribute to a climate opposed to output stabilization 
by monetary policy makers without much basis for such opposition. There must be 
strong empirical evidence for the signifi cant benefi cial effects of infl ation targeting 
on infl ation persistence and (bond) market stability and especially of countercyclical 
monetary policy on the real economy (even when undertaken by highly credible cen-
tral banks like the Federal Reserve). Strong empirical confi rmation of the conditional 
view should be awaited before making any decisions upon it.12
The Disturbing View of Central Bank Transparency
The next issue is how a high level of transparency might be harmful. The weaker 
version of how central bank transparency might cause harm to policymaking and 
economic outcomes is the “disturbing” view. In this view, if the central bank disclos-
es too much information the public may be confused. Also, the public may become 
disturbed if central bank fails to accomplish announced goal or forecast. This confu-
sion will give an opening for opportunistic politicians to criticize the central bank. 
So disclosure leads to confusion, which leads to politicization, which in turn disturbs 
optimizing central bankers into reacting to short-term pressures and targets.13 This 
view is very different from that of the irrelevance view of central bank transparency. 
For instance, the Bank of Japan has opposed the infl ation-targeting regime, partially 
due to fear that they would fail to fulfi ll an announced objective. 
68 Borivoje D. Kruskovic
It would be wise to examine the effects of transparency when intermediates ob-
jectives on infl ation are not fulfi lled and particularly measure political pressures 
(perhaps represented by newspaper reports of criticism of the central bank by legis-
lators). There is some evidence that increasing transparency is associated with lower 
average infl ation rates, which is the opposite of disturbing view - that disclosure 
gives the opportunity for political pressures.
The Diverting View of Central Bank Transparency
The central bank transparency might cause harm to policy making and economic 
outcomes since the announced infl ation targets and other disclosures force the cen-
tral bank to follow the rules more strictly. This view is called the “diverting “view 
because the infl exibility and imprecise (infl ation) targets divert the central bank’s 
attention from responding appropriately (optimally) to shocks. This is the real mir-
ror image of the assurance view - the key information for the central bank to release 
is its medium-term targets and ultimate goals, but in this view by releasing that 
information the central bank creates increased disturbance (rather than increased 
public trust), resulting in less discretion (rather than more fl exibility) in responding 
to economic events.14
The theoretical view that central banks might be excessively constrained by ex-
plicit infl ation targets or other forms of disclosure, however, does not mean that they 
inherently must be or that they in fact are so constrained. Kuttner and Posen (1999, 
2000, 2001) have investigated the behavior of central banks before and after infl ation 
target announcements as its response to economic shocks. They found that infl ation 
targeting of central banks increase their fl exibility in responding to shocks, and show 
no reduced fl exibility in responding to output volatility.
Conclusion
Transparency in central bank operations has become one of the key characteristics in 
monetary policy. The term “transparency” has been used without adequate transla-
tion, which is also common in other countries. This paper defi nes transparency as 
well as different views of central bank transparency (assuring, exacting, irrelevance, 
conditional, disturbing and diverting). Transparency is defi ned as the absence of 
asymmetrical information between fi nancial markets and monetary policy makers.
In literature on monetary policy there are six different views of central bank trans-
parency. The public could be assured via information such as monetary policy objec-
tives and their fulfi llment, description of monetary policy regime, current measures, 
as well as their expected effects (Assuring view). The public and particularly markets 
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could fi nd it easier to plan their activities if the central bank prognosis and respective 
explanations are available (Exacting view). The public can fi nd all announcements 
of the central bank irrelevant as long as central banks start to respond to shocks more 
strictly (Irrelevance view). The public, and especially markets, can become greatly 
aware of central bank activities and demand information about central bank mandate 
and voting of particular members of monetary board (Conditional view). The pub-
lic, and particularly markets, can become disturbed if central bank fails to fulfi ll its 
objectives or forecasts. Also, too much information can pose a threat since this can 
make the public confused (Disturbing view). The public can make pressure on the 
fulfi llment of announced objective thus diverting central bank from optimal response 
to shocks. If politicians become involved in such situation, the result shall be higher 
level of intervention than it is desirable (Diverting view). Only two of the views – the 
assuring and the exacting – have clear empirical support. Central bank announce-
ment of medium-term infl ation targets increase fl exibility in response to shocks and 
decrease infl ation persistence, with obvious important welfare benefi ts; the disclo-
sure of information regarding specifi c interest rate movements reduces volatility in 
bond markets (except at the very short time-horizon).
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